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PEER-REVIEWED
Progress in Science and Science at the
Non-Western Peripheries∗
Deepanwita Dasgupta†
Assuming that progress in science means effectiveness at
problem-solving, this paper discusses how a progressive scientific
tradition can be created by a peripheral scientific community. A
mechanism of peripheral scientific growth is proposed, and it is
illustrated with an Indian case study. The conclusion of the paper
is that scientific collaboration between metropolitan and peripheral
research communities is frequently characterized by a persistent
inequality of intellectual authority due to inequality in their epistemic
transactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of a scientific community at a given location depends
on two things: first, the availability of a variety of theories and opinions
to its members, and second, the ability of (some) members of that
community to create new exemplars with the help of those theories. In
Against Method (1988), Feyerabend argues that the smooth functioning
of a progressive scientific community depends on two principles: first,
the principle of tenacity, according to which scientists hold onto attractive
theories in spite of initial difficulties so as to develop those theories’
full potential, and second, the principle of proliferation, which constantly
motivates scientists to produce new theories and perspectives, providing
a rich marketplace of ideas. The meshing together of these two principles
(within a research community) creates an autonomous and a progressive
tradition in science.1
The debate on scientific knowledge has always focused most strongly
upon the question of whether science is rational. But an equally
∗Received July 2009. Revised paper accepted November 2009.
†A PhD candidate at the University of Minnesota, Deepanwita Dasgupta’s research
interests are knowledge-networks in science, science in the non-West, and divisions of
cognitive labor in science.
1There is, of course, another crucial causal factor in the emergence of a new scientific
community, i.e., the availability of sufficient funding. From the perspective of science
policy, sufficient funding must be available to a scientific community before it can develop
or pursue any research programs. My thanks to my anonymous referees for underscoring
this point.
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controversial question has also been whether science is progressive,
and if so, in exactly what sense science makes progress. Traditionally
speaking, philosophers have always taken science to be a progressive
enterprise (see for example, Reichenbach 1938; Popper 1963; Lakatos
1970; Laudan 1977; and more recently, Niiniluoto 1984; Kitcher 1993) but
neither philosophers nor scientists have been able to answer, to everyone’s
satisfaction, what constitute the markers of such scientific progress.
Yet in a clearly intuitive sense, science does make progress, for we
observe scientific communities solving numerous theoretical and practical
problems. Talking about science–in the last resort–amounts to talking
about such communities and their successful endeavours. This was a
major insight offered by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962) which I shall accept in this paper, and consider, following Kuhn,
science to be the collective endeavours of such communities. For the
purpose of this paper, I will take progress in science to mean how (some)
scientific communities successfully carry out a particular piece of research
in order to solve a problem, and how they communicate this result to
their peers with the aim of receiving their assent and their consensus.2
Naturally, during this process of creation and communication of scientific
knowledge, those communities are characterized by certain features that
influence their epistemic endeavours and determine the outcome of their
work. Progress in science can be construed in terms of the properties that
determine the success (or, conversely, the failure) of their efforts, progress
being achieved by those communities that exhibit some kind of epistemic
gain.
The traditional literature on progress in science sees science mainly as
a collection of theories, and thus, progress in science was viewed mainly
as changes in the truth-contents of those theories.3 In 1977, however,
Larry Laudan proposed an alternative reading of scientific progress
(Laudan 1977). Instead of emphasizing the truth contents of a scientific
theory, Laudan focused on effectiveness at problem-solving as the true
marker of scientific activity. Thus, an increase in scientific knowledge
means increased ability at problem-solving–whether this ability belongs to
science in general or to a given scientific community. This was previously
also said by Kuhn, and it is this approach that I shall accept for the purpose
of this paper. Hence, instead of talking about scientific progress from
2Thus, in this essay progress will mean both an achievement and the process by which
the community gains such achievements.
3However, important advances in science could be made when a scientific community
discovers that the theory or the model that it has been entertaining is false. The
importance of falsification in science has been underscored by both Popper and Lakatos,
for avoiding errors is an important part of scientific practice. My thanks to my two
anonymous referees for drawing my attention to this important point.
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a meta-level, in this paper I shall be concerned with scientific progress
of particular scientific communities–how they produce a specific output
of scientific research; how they engage in an inter-community dynamic
in order to communicate their results to their peers; and how they gain
a consensus. In short, I shall adopt in this paper a community-based,
internalist view of scientific progress.4 Thus, the question of scientific
progress will translate into a question of how scientific communities
successfully conduct (and conclude) their research endeavours in order
to create exemplars that give themselves the maximal problem-solving
capacity and allow them to build a stable research tradition.
In this paper, I shall address the question of progressiveness of
research communities from a non-standard angle. Instead of talking about
scientific progress within the standard contexts of Euro-American research
communities, I shall ask instead what makes a peripheral scientific
community, i.e., a scientific community outside Europe and North America,
progressive and how such research communities generate an output
of scientific knowledge. I shall propose a mechanism of how scientific
knowledge is made by such peripheral research communities–creating
a condition of progressiveness for their communities at home–but also
makes them crucially dependent upon science done elsewhere. To
illustrate this theoretical framework of scientific knowledge-making under
peripheral conditions, I shall introduce a case study from twentieth-century
history of science–the formulation of Bose-Einstein statistics in 1924 by
Satyendra Nath Bose, an unknown, young scientist from colonial British
India. I shall argue that an analysis of Bose’s work shows us the constraints
of a peripheral scientific researcher (as well as that of his or her community,
especially during its pioneering stages), revealing the stages through
which the work of a peripheral researcher must pass before it can splice
with the metropolitan scientific efforts so as to become part of normal
science. But before we proceed to such theoretical considerations of
scientific knowledge-making from the peripheries, let us first consider
what makes a research community peripheral, what the epistemic markers
4For a lucid discussion on the different notion of progress implied in science,
see Alexander Bird, “What is Scientific Progress?” Nous 41:1 (2007): 92-117. Bird
discusses three possible ways to understand scientific progresses: as an accumulation of
knowledge (epistemic progress); as an accumulation of truth or truth-likeness (semantic
progress); and finally, as the enhancement of the problem-solving capacities of a
research community (instrumental progress). In this essay, I shall adopt the perspective of
instrumental progress, thereby assuming the standpoint of a researcher who is seeking
to produce scientific knowledge in collaboration with his or her peers. Thus this essay
will consider only under what circumstances such scientists would agree that they are
making progress. My thanks to my two anonymous referees who urged me to clarify this
important issue.
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of such peripherality are, and how it affects that community’s ability to
produce new scientific knowledge.
II. WHAT IS PERIPHERAL SCIENCE? SIX CRITERIA OF A VIABLE
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
Research communities that are progressive in the sense of being more
productive at problem-solving can exist in two contexts. Firstly, they may
exist where people and their knowledge are highly concentrated, e.g., as
in metropolitan communities. But a large number of scientific communities
also work from various places of lesser knowledge concentration, from the
so-called peripheries of scientific knowledge. Such communities generally
work in an atmosphere of social and institutional isolation, away from the
metropolitan centres of research, but nevertheless participate in the same
task of making scientific knowledge. They are also often geographically
distant from such centres, but physical distance alone is not the true
marker of their peripherality. The complexity of modern science frequently
distributes the cognitive labour of research among different cultures
and societies, spreading scientific research among different research
communities, but such globalizing trends alone do not make a community
peripheral. The crucial marks of peripherality arise from an inequality of
epistemic relationship between the two communities–when one cannot
make knowledge or generate a consensus without involving the other.
Historically, we observe the emergence of such peripheral scientific
communities from the late nineteenth century, when, in the wake of
European expansion in Asia (and Africa), a number of peripheral research
communities came into existence–consisting at first of many expatriate
scientists and later of scientists of non-Western origin–in distant countries
such as Japan, Korea, and India. Scientists from those distant centres
have since then made significant contributions to scientific knowledge,
but their internal dynamics of scientific knowledge-production and their
interactions with their metropolitan peers have not yet received sufficient
philosophical analysis and attention (but see Traweek 1988). The purpose
of this paper is to begin tentatively this kind of work.
A question may be raised at this point about the aim of my paper–do I
seek to provide a sociological or a philosophical account of non-Western
science? While I think that a good sociological analysis may, in itself,
provide us with important philosophical insights, what I shall try to develop
in what follows is an epistemic analysis of peripherality–what is to be a
peripheral researcher in science. The objective of this paper will therefore
be to consider how a network of expertise and scientific knowledge is
built in the peripheral context and how this network allows a peripheral
research community to gain its first foothold in scientific research. This
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means, furthermore, that I shall be mostly concerned in this essay with the
pioneering stages of a peripheral scientific community, i.e., with the time
when such a community lacks a critical mass at home.
Thus, from the peripheral point of view, research communities can be
divided into two sorts: first, the metropolitan communities, located at highly
concentrated centres of scientific research, mostly located in different
Euro-American centres, and a wider, sparser network of smaller research
communities, located over a wider area of the globe. The landscape of
scientific knowledge is thus not uniform–as is commonly presupposed–but
rather uneven in nature.5 The researchers of the latter type remain
socially and physically distant from their metropolitan communities–and
their invisible colleges–but they share the same work of making scientific
knowledge and thus naturally aspire to be counted among the progressive
scientific communities. But their distance–whether social, geographical
or institutional–places them under various constraints of peripherality,
influencing the outcome of their research work. Given that this was the
epistemic landscape within which much of the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century science actually developed, a general analysis of the
knowledge-making conditions of such scientific communities seems to be
at least called for. The question thus arises: how do such communities
work towards a condition of progressiveness that creates an autonomous
research tradition at their home base? By what methods are their scientific
outputs validated, how do they collaborate with their metropolitan peers,
and could such peripheral communities ever develop a new paradigm in
science? In the rest of this paper, I shall try to provide some tentative
replies to these questions with the help of a simple feedback mechanism
and a case study drawn from the peripheral location of India.
Little philosophical literature currently exists on how peripheral
communities emerge, communicate, and carry on their task of making
scientific knowledge, and what–if anything–keeps them from their
goal of attaining scientific progress. Discussions of rationality and
progressiveness in science are carried on primarily by keeping the
metropolitan centres of science in view. The emergence of new research
communities has, however, received some attention from a different type
of analysis of scientific knowledge: analysis of science development and
5The distribution of scientific research in the world is presently more asymmetrical
than the distribution of wealth. Research efforts and research funding are concentrated
in a few Euro-American countries, which produce most of the journal literature in science
and thus naturally dominate the reward structure of science. For a detailed discussion of
this issue and of how peripheral scientific communities should respond to it, see Subbiah
Arunachalam, “Peripherality in Science: What Should be Done to Help Peripheral Science
Get Assimilated into Mainstream Science,” Technical Report, Publication and Information
Directorate, New Delhi, (1982): 67-76.
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science policy. In a science policy paper that focused on the question
of what necessary elements must be in place before a new scientific
community can emerge in a Less Developed Country (LDC) and what
characteristics have to be exhibited by those newly emerging LDC
communities, Mike Moravcsik, who spent considerable time as a science
policy advisor in Pakistan, proposed an interesting list of six criteria
(Moravcsik 1978, 8-13). This list of criteria determines, according to him,
how a viable scientific community can emerge at a LDC location. Those
proposed six parameters for the birth of a new community are as follows:
1) motivation, which includes curiosity, aesthetic satisfaction, or sense of
collective achievement such as national glory; 2) subject matter, which,
according to Moravcsik, is universal, no matter what the social context of
the science in question;6 3) ideology, which implies that LCD scientists
should be motivated, somehow, by the goals of possible international
collaboration;7 4) methodology, which is universal; and finally, the two
criteria that link science to the issues of development: 5) applications and
6) infrastructure.
This interesting list provides good advice, no doubt, but it also shows
why a newly emerging scientific community often finds itself heavily
dependent upon science done elsewhere. In many non-Western locations
such as India, modern science and the beginning of a professional
scientific community typically begins with a phase of “colonial science,”8
i.e., science organized to serve the needs of information for a colonial
state. Most such locations began first with an array of field sciences,
such as botany or geology, and only later on went to develop pure
university-based sciences, such as physics. In scenarios with this kind
of complication, the so-called uniform ingredients of scientific activity,
such as methodology or subject matter, appeared, in the beginning, as
large-scale imports from outside via a state-sponsored education system
that introduced Western knowledge into the colonies (also known as the
“civilizing mission”). A culture of scientific research in such locations is
thus either perceived as an import, or worse, an imposition, having little
root in the psyche of the indigenous researchers. As for the application
and the infrastructure, the peripheral practitioners of science rarely inherit
any functional structure. Mostly, they have to build up their own supporting
structure in the course of their professional work.
6Moravcsik was of course working with a traditional, universalistic image of science, in
which knowledge always radiates from a metropolis to its various peripheries.
7Here Moravcsik remarks that in LDC countries, where science is not yet a “traditional
activity,” peripheral scientists often lack high degrees of motivation.
8See Rajesh Kochar, “Science and Domination: India Before and After Independence,”
Current Science 76 (1999): 596-601, on a three-stage theory of the origins of modern
science in India.
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In the hybrid contexts of such peripheral research communities, the
context of justification and the contexts of discovery (Reichenbach 1938)
can no longer be kept cleanly apart, and the well-known distinction
between the context of discovery and context of justification becomes
considerably muddled. Contexts of discovery begins to interpenetrate
those of justification in such circumstances, for “justification” in these
peripheral research communities signifies a range of social and
cognitive processes that occur largely outside of that peripheral research
community, thereby assuming a delicate dynamic of communication and
collaboration between the peripheral community and its metropolitan
counterpart.9 Peripheral researchers are thus generally faced with a
standing set of epistemic constraints. To begin with, they start with a less
than critical concentration of researchers at home, which forces them to
be dependent on their metropolitan counterparts–not only as inspiration
for the subject matters and applications of their research, but also for their
validation system, their rewards, and their recognitions of priority. Because
they are so dependent, their ability to stick to a line of thinking and nurture
it in the face of metropolitan non-acceptance is critically limited. The virtue
of tenacity that Feyerabend recommended for budding scientific theories
(and thus by extension, to new research communities as well) seems to be
rarely available for peripheral researchers.
Thus, in sum, peripheral research communities are characterized
by the following general features: 1) an absence of a viable scientific
community; 2) an insularity resulting from insufficient access to information
or communication;10 3) a long phase-lag before peripheral researchers
become aware of the most significant, hot topics discussed in the
metropolis; 4) a weaker institutional infrastructure at home, such as
inadequately equipped research laboratories or a less than adequate
peer review system; and finally and most importantly, 5) an excessive
dependence on science done elsewhere.11 While (1) and (4) refer to
peripheral researchers’ situation at home, (2), (3) and (5) are mostly about
their relationship with their corresponding metropolitan community.
Yet, historical evidence indicates that such peripheral communities
9See David W. Chambers, “Period and Process in Colonial and National Science,” in
Scientific Colonialism: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, eds. Nathan Reingold and Marc
Rothenberg (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1987), 297-321. It is of
course presumed in my discussion that justification is not an abstract logical process.
Justification, in my view, implies social as well as cognitive processes that are tied to
specific locations.
10It is in this respect that the World Wide Web can be a friendly tool for a peripheral
scientist.
11This section depends heavily on Subbiah Arunachalam (1982), and his analysis of
the research conditions of a peripheral scientific community.
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often succeed, surprisingly, in creating and maintaining a successful
culture of scientific research, and can appear progressive–at least for
the time being.12 In fact, often their very peripheral status acts as their
incentive, challenging such communities into singular endeavours of
problem-solving in order to gain a foothold of some kind within the reward
structure of metropolitan science. This creates, in turn, the beginnings of
an autonomous research tradition within their home bases. But notice
that in order to be counted as a viable scientific community–let alone
a progressive one–a peripheral researcher needs to produce some sort
of a striking exemplar that would grant him or her a first entry onto the
stage of metropolitan science, achieving some empirical success13 for
his or her home community.14 It is this task that falls on the individual
peripheral researcher, who must take up an unsolved issue within
metropolitan science and try his or her hand at solving that problem
by engaging in some creative scientific reasoning. Thus, the emergence
and stabilization of a scientific culture within peripheral communities
depends crucially upon their ability to solve some metropolitan problem
and create a striking exemplar. But before any exemplars can be created,
several other factors must be taken into account: firstly, that smaller
scientific community must seize on a problem of maximum epistemic
significance–a problem whose solution will be valued at a metropolis.
It must then attain a solution for that problem, and finally and most
importantly, it must have that solution endorsed by some member(s) of
the metropolitan research community. If all these steps go well, then
their work provides a foundation upon which a research program can be
built at home, where more researchers can participate and contribute,
creating an ongoing progressive research tradition. But if this multi-level
process breaks down in any of its stages, the peripheral research
community does not achieve its aspired state of progressiveness. Thus,
progress for such communities depends crucially upon the details of their
inter-community dynamic and inter-community collaboration with another,
geographically distant but epistemically more privileged, metropolitan
community rather than upon the conversations and communications within
12Japanese microbiology during the early twentieth century and Indian theoretical
physics during 1920-1930 are two good examples of such peripheral but progressive
scientific communities.
13On the notion of empirical success in science, see Miriam Solomon, Social
Empiricism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
14‘Home community’ refers to more than one’s home institution. In a peripheral context,
the ‘home community’ refers to the other institutions and to the researchers who are also
engaged in the task of making scientific knowledge. By extension, such a community
might also include (some) public intellectuals and technologists who have developed an
interest in the fortunes of such scientific endeavours.
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their own home community. For the metropolitan researchers, however,
precisely the opposite is the case: it is conversation within their own
home community that produces a consensus for such researchers. The
peripheral researchers, in contrast, must gather their consensus from
outside.15 This less-than-privileged access to certain epistemic networks
and the inability of peripheral researchers to perform a full range of
epistemic operations for themselves, which is necessary to generate
scientific consensus, creates a non-equality of intellectual authority for
such peripheral researchers, placing them within a difficult and derivative
form of scientific practice at the peripheries of scientific knowledge.
III. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE-MAKING WITHIN A PERIPHERAL
RESEARCH COMMUNITY: THE FEEDBACK LOOP OF SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS
If progressiveness can be attained by peripheral researchers, by what
mechanism is this progress created and sustained (if only for short-lived
periods)? The analysis of the previous section has shown that in peripheral
science, there are two aspects to any scientific activity: first, the move to
form into a recognizable scientific community, and second, the need to
make progress in lockstep with a more privileged metropolitan community
from whom the peripheral researcher hopes to obtain a consensus. This
metropolitan consensus is thereafter used as a foundation to build a
secure tradition of scientific research at home.
These two stages feed into each other in the form of a feedback
loop, for success in obtaining a metropolitan consensus clearly enhances
success in being a viable scientific community that can undertake more
ambitious projects of problem-solving in the future. Historically speaking,
a peripheral research community reaches a state of progressiveness
when, in a given historical situation, these two stages smoothly mesh
into each other, giving rise to a stable tradition at the home base of
the peripheral researcher. In the rest of this section, I shall briefly show
how such a process briefly happened in one specific periphery–in early
twentieth-century colonial India.
The beginnings of modern science in India–like the beginnings
of modern science in many other former European colonies–started
with an array of field sciences. But during 1910-1930, the flow of
Western education, combined with the peaking of national sentiments,
produced a new situation. Science, especially basic science, offered an
attractive avenue of escape for intelligent minds from the very restricted
15Whether a peripheral community can generate its own consensus is an interesting
question, to which I shall respond below.
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opportunities offered by the colonial state. It also allowed a place where
those restrictions could be challenged by gaining a ground in pure
theoretical knowledge. The result was a short-lived but a flourishing culture
in basic sciences that became institutionalized around the metropolitan
city of Calcutta, giving rise to many of the country’s present-day scientific
institutions.
For peripheral scientific researchers, scientific progress unpacks into
two stages: first, their proposal of a solution to some current metropolitan
research problem, followed by the stage of its validation by some
metropolitan researcher(s) that clinches their priority to that solution. The
limitations of peripheral researchers stems from the fact that while they
can work on a metropolitan problem (and sometimes find a solution),
their access to the epistemic processes that validate that solution (thereby
establishing their priority) and establish a consensus about their work
at the metropolis is a matter that remains largely outside of their grasp.
The difficulties of peripheral researchers thus stems from their restricted
epistemic access to the knowledge-networks in science, which in turn, also
restricts their entry into the reward structure of science. Thus, in a certain
sense, the peripheral scientific communities work upon the problems
generated by metropolitan scientific communities rather than on problems
of their own. Their ability to attain progressiveness is therefore conditional
upon someone else performing a number of epistemic operations on their
behalf, which makes it more than likely that a peripheral researcher may
end up with several failed research programs during the course of his
or her professional life. With every successful cycle of the loop in Fig.
1, a peripheral research community gains more stability that enhances
its ability to take on further metropolitan problems, eventually perhaps
creating enough exemplars to generate subject matters and applications of
its own. When a community thus generates its own subject matters and its
own applications–and can produce the necessary consensus for the next
cycle of scientific knowledge-making–it gains the status of an autonomous
scientific community.
An objection may be raised at this point: can a peripheral researcher
generate a consensus based entirely on the resources of his or her
own home community? An answer to this question will depend, I think,
on the detailed consideration of the stages of that peripheral scientific
community’s development. When a peripheral scientific community has
established a long history of collaboration with a metropolis–having
been awarded several episodes of consensus for their work–and has
grown into the stage of a sophisticated, urban community with perhaps
peripheries of its own, it could at least produce a dissenting view, if not
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a full-fledged consensus, on behalf of its work.16 But during an earlier,
and a more pioneering stage, such options may not be available for
a peripheral researcher, whose work–once rejected by the metropolitan
community–frequently suffers complete oblivion in the history of science.
The following diagram describes the process of scientific
knowledge-making at the peripheries, the success of which propels
a peripheral community towards progressiveness. But alternatively, if the
loop fails, it creates a setback for the peripheral researcher.
Figure 1: The feedback loop of scientific progress for a peripheral research community.
When research efforts are distributed between a metropolitan and a
peripheral scientific community in a cycle of scientific knowledge-making,
which community gets to decide if progress has indeed been made by a
peripheral researcher? Historically, it seems that this decision has always
been made by the more epistemically privileged metropolitan community.
Progress Made by a Peripheral Scientist: the Story of S.N. Bose and
Bose-Einstein Statistics
The feedback loop that I described above as characteristic of peripheral
research communities–the failure of which can set the peripheral
16Indeed, C.V. Raman (1888-1970), another Indian physicist, whose research on
the crystal lattice structure in diamonds landed him in a sharp controversy with Max
Born, may be considered to be an example of this kind of peripheral dissent (to a
metropolitan scientific theory). For a detailed analysis of this controversy and its outcome
for Raman, see Abha Sur, “Aesthetics, Authority and Control in an Indian Laboratory: The
Raman-Born Controversy in Lattice Dynamics,” Isis 90:1 (1999): 25-49.
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community back from its course of progressiveness for several decades–is
strikingly illustrated in one of the well known episodes of twentieth-century
physics–the formulation of Bose-Einstein statistics by a young Indian
named Satyendra Nath Bose.17 Bose’s rigorous derivation of Planck’s
law in 1924 provided the first non-classical proof of Planck’s formula
on blackbody radiation. By producing a proof that was free from all
classical assumptions of light as a wave, Bose provided a theoretical
ground that established Einstein’s light-quantum hypothesis beyond all
reasonable doubt. His modest four-page paper, titled “Planck’s Law and
the Light-quantum Hypothesis,” published in July 1924 in Zeitschrift fr
Physik, provided this solution by means of a simple but remarkable move.18
In the course of his elegant proof of Planck’s law, Bose simply assumed
that the light-quanta in the blackbody radiation field are indistinguishable
particles. This implicit assumption (stated nowhere explicitly in his paper)
led him to modify Boltzmann’s statistics in a novel manner. By mentally
modelling the radiation field as a grid of phase spaces, Bose in effect
transformed the field into a collection of phase space cells within which the
light quanta could be accommodated. He then calculated the equilibrium
of this revised system by simply calculating in how many ways those cells
could be populated by (indistinguishable) particles, instead of counting
how many individual particles could occupy a given number of cells
(the old Boltzmannian statistics). This neat reversal introduced what is
called the indistinguishability hypothesis in quantum mechanics, laying
the foundation for a new kind of statistics. With Einstein’s endorsement
of Bose’s idea and his application of Bose’s counting procedure to the
theory of monoatomic gases, a new quantum statistics was born, and a
quantum theory based on the indistinguishability hypothesis ushered in a
new revolution in physics. Yet, astonishing though it seems, Bose did not
take any part into this larger transformation, in spite of producing one of its
fundamental early results. In fact, shortly after 1926 he moved altogether
away from radiation theory, thus raising the suspicion among his European
colleagues that he had become a drop-out from science. How can we
make sense of Bose’s initial involvement–and his later withdrawal–from
a topic that once so intensely interested him?
Without Einstein’s personal support–it was he who communicated
Bose’s first paper to Zeitschrift fr Physik, translating it into German–Bose
might never have published his result, for he had already been rejected
17Or S. N. Bose, as he was known to his colleagues in the West.
18Bose’s first paper was translated by Einstein and submitted to Zeitschrift fr Physik on
2 July 1924. For an English translation of this paper, see Santimoy Chatterjee, ed. S.N.
Bose: the Man and His Work, vol. 1. (Calcutta: S.N. Bose Centre for Basic Sciences,
1994): 100-103.
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by the Philosophical Magazine. Born in 1853 in the colonial British city
of Calcutta, Bose was among the first generation of Indian researchers
who had the objective of setting up a new tradition of scientific research
at their home base. As peripheral scientists working from a distant British
colony, this small group of young men of which Bose was a part, began
their research by taking an interest in the ‘new science’ that was then
sweeping Europe.19 It is in the course of their encounter with this ‘new
science’ that Bose came upon the blackbody radiation problem which
was then confronting the metropolitan community in Europe. Planck’s law
had provided the experimentally correct result, but it was still riddled with
theoretical contradictions. Bose’s choice of subject matter thus came from
his grasp of this metropolitan impasse. By reasoning consistently on the
basis of a mental model that saw radiation as a gas of light quanta–his
very isolation cutting him off from the thought patterns of other European
physicists–Bose was able to carry out a reversal in established thinking.
When his solution was rejected by the Philosophical Magazine, Bose
sent his paper to Einstein instead, and Einstein’s quick endorsement
of his results–and its speedy extension to the problem of monoatomic
gases–created the first metropolitan consensus for Bose and his small
scientific community in India.
Unfortunately, the feedback loop that worked flawlessly the first time
failed on Bose’s second, and a more ambitious, attempt. Bose wrote a
second paper immediately after the first on the topic of the interaction of
matter and radiation, and as usual, he sent it to Einstein. In an ambitious
two-part project, in this paper Bose sought to derive the general conditions
for the statistical equilibrium of a system that contained both matter and
radiation but was independent of any special assumptions about the
nature of those radiative processes.20 Hoping to build upon Einstein’s
work and remove all arbitrary assumptions from that work (just as he
had done the first time), Bose rejected Einstein’s special assumptions
about there being two kinds of radiative processes–spontaneous and
induced–by means of which an atom of higher energy shifts down to a
lower energy level. Instead, he claimed that the transition from a higher
energy state to a lower energy state could be explained without using
an additional hypothesis, such as spontaneous transitions. A spontaneous
transition, such as radioactivity, could be explained, Bose claimed, more
19In order to provide themselves with some key texts for this ‘new’ science, Bose and
his colleague, M.N. Saha, translated Einstein’s papers on General Relativity from German
into English, thereby producing the first English translation of those papers.
20The title of Bose’s second paper in English translation is: “Thermal Equilibrium in the
Radiation Field in the Presence of Matter,” submitted to Zeitschrift fr Physik on 7 July
1924 by Einstein. For an English translation of the second paper, see S.N. Bose: the Man
and His Work, vol 1, 114-21.
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straightforwardly as having arisen out of the statistical properties of the
radiation field itself, consistent with all equilibrium conditions.
This time Bose failed to wrest a consensus for his novel idea of a unified
radiative process. Einstein did communicate Bose’s paper to the same
journal, but he appended a strongly critical note to the paper and rejected
Bose’s ideas in personal communication. Thus Bose’s ambitious project
of developing a research program built on the notion of a unified radiative
process was abandoned in the face of Einstein’s non-acceptance. The gist
of Bose’s idea came back later in Dirac’s method of second quantization,
but by then it was too late to resurrect either Bose or his views on
radiation.21 Faced with opposition from the greatest metropolitan authority
in science of his time–Einstein–Bose considered it prudent to abandon the
topic of radiation theory altogether and move away to different, and to more
experimental fields of science, such as crystallography and chemistry.
Thus his second paper on radiation theory lay forgotten among the pages
of Zeitschrift fr Physik, a precursor to the later quantum theory but nothing
more. For a peripheral researcher, focused intently upon the task of
developing an independent culture of scientific research at home, Bose’s
most prudent move was to shift his focus of research to an area where a
consensus from metropolitan community could be more easily obtained.
Thus, he applied himself to chemistry and crystallography, in which one of
his younger colleagues, K. S. Krishnan, later did well-known work, initiating
a tradition of crystallographic research at Dhaka University (in present-day
Bangladesh). But this was not done under Bose’s own name.
Thus, Bose’s remarkable initial success in proving Planck’s law and
his later disappointment over his second paper in radiation theory shows
us how a colonial researcher who seeks to make scientific knowledge
from a periphery builds a network with his or her metropolitan scientific
community, and how the fragile feedback loop–of which the colonial
researcher is a part–can create a progressive scientific tradition at the
peripheries by repeated iterations. But conversely, if the loop fails, it lands
the peripheral researcher with a failed research program, which clearly
happened to Bose with his second paper.
What exactly did Bose contribute to the peripheral Indian community
as it existed during the decades of 1920s? Since his own metropolitan
success consisted of a brilliant but a brief episode, Bose personally
was not able to create many iterated loops of knowledge. My argument,
however, is that he succeeded in creating a path for such future iterations.
After Bose, other peripheral researchers from his home community could
21For a detailed discussion of Bose’s second paper, and whether his proposals were
indeed precursors of the new quantum theory, see Partho Ghosh, “Bose-Statistics: A
Historical Perspective,” in S.N. Bose: the Man and His Work, vol. 1. 35-67.
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join in science and build upon the exemplars left by their previous
generations, eventually creating a stronger network of scientific knowledge
at the periphery. In this sense, Bose acted as a pioneer for the nascent
scientific community in India, giving it a template of what it is to be a
peripheral scientist from such a location.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the consequences of this analysis is that we see a clear
case of persistent asymmetry in intellectual authority arising between
the peripheral and metropolitan research communities, especially in
those cases when a scientific controversy arises between the two. This
persistent inequality differentially influences the output of knowledge by
a peripheral community and thus influences its subsequent success at
creating and sustaining an autonomous and progressive research tradition
in its home grounds. This result is contrary to several analyses of scientific
knowledge developed in the recent times from a social-epistemological
point of view, such as that of Longino (1990, 78-79), who maintains
that an equality of intellectual authority is the norm in scientific
communication among different research communities. But if the history of
the scientific endeavours of colonial and peripheral scientific communities
are fully taken into account, such claims may turn out to be–on closer
scrutiny–more like cases of hopeful fiction. Good science, however, may
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